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1. Introduction
The traditional framework of social-choice theory as initiated by Arrow [1951, 1963] ad-
dresses the issue of aggregating proﬁles of individual preference relations into a social
preference relation. One way of escape from the negative conclusion of his impossibil-
ity theorem consists of expanding the informational base of collective choice by assuming
that individual preferences are represented by utility functions and allowing for inter-
personal comparisons of utility, thereby moving away from the narrow conﬁnes of Arrow’s
assumption of ordinal measurability and interpersonal non-comparability; see, for instance,
d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977], Hammond [1979] and Sen [1977] for possibility results and
characterizations under various informational assumptions. An extensive survey of the lit-
erature on social choice with interpersonal utility comparisons is provided by Bossert and
Weymark [2004].
Most of the literature on social-choice theory treats the population as ﬁxed, and
the notion of variable-population social evaluation has its origins in applied ethics. In
particular, Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984] is usually credited with introducing the axiomatic
approach to populations ethics, and his contribution continues to be one of the most
inﬂuential in the area; see, for instance, Ryberg and Ta¨nnsjo¨ [2004]. The approach we
follow is welfarist: in order to compare any two alternatives (whose populations may diﬀer),
the only information required consists of the sets those alive in the respective alternatives
and their lifetime utilities. The extension of ﬁxed-population social-evaluation methods to
a variable-population context is important because so many public-policy decisions involve
endogenous population. For instance, when determining public spending on pre-natal care,
on foreign-aid packages with population consequences or on intergenerational resource
allocation, the assumption that the population is ﬁxed is diﬃcult to justify. Therefore,
more comprehensive criteria are called for.
Following the usual convention in population ethics, we assume that utilities represent
individual lifetime well-being and are normalized so that a lifetime utility of zero represents
neutrality. Above neutrality, a life, as a whole, is worth living; below neutrality, it is not.
From the viewpoint of an individual, a neutral life is a life which is as good as one in
which the person has no experiences; see, for instance, Broome [1993, 2004, ch. 8], Heyd
[1992, ch. 1], McMahan [1996] and Parﬁt [1984, Appendix G] for discussions. People
who do not exist do not have interests or preferences and, therefore, we take the view
that it is not possible to say that an individual can gain (or lose) by being brought into
existence with a utility level above (or below) neutrality. Someone who is alive might have
an attitude, such as a desire or preference, toward a world in which the person does not
exist but that attitude could hardly be construed as individual betterness or worseness.
Similarly, a person who is alive and expresses satisfaction with her or his existence (that
is, with having been born) cannot be claiming that existence is better (for him or her)
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than nonexistence. Note that this does not prevent an individual from gaining or losing
by continuing to live—the continuation or termination of life is a matter of length of life,
not existence itself.
A commonly-used principle is classical utilitarianism, also referred to as total utili-
tarianism. It ranks any two alternatives by comparing the total utilities of the individuals
alive in them. Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984, ch. 19] observed that classical utilitarianism leads
to the repugnant conclusion. A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion if
every alternative in which everyone alive experiences a utility level above neutrality is
ranked as worse than an alternative in which each member of a larger population has a
utility level that is above neutrality but may be arbitrarily close to it. This means that
population size can always be used to substitute for quality of life as long as lives are (pos-
sibly barely) worth living. As Parﬁt’s analysis demonstrates, the repugnant conclusion is
implied by any population principle that: (i) declares the ceteris-paribus addition of an
individual above neutrality to a given population to be a social improvement; (ii) ranks
any alternative with an equal utility distribution as at least as good as any alternative
involving the same population, the same total utility but an unequal distribution of well-
being; and (iii) ranks same-population equal-utility alternatives by declaring that with a
higher common utility level to be better.
For any alternative, the critical level of utility is that level which, if experienced
by an added person without changing the utilities of the existing population, leads to
an alternative which is as good as the original. Clearly, the choice of critical levels has
important consequences for the properties of a population principle and is closely linked
to the possibility of avoiding the repugnant conclusion.
Average utilitarianism uses average rather than total utility to rank alternatives. It
does not imply the repugnant conclusion but has other defects, such as declaring the ceteris-
paribus addition of an individual with a lifetime utility well below neutrality desirable as
long as the existing population’s average utility is even lower. Thus, other population
principles are called for, and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion has become an impor-
tant criterion that acceptable principles should satisfy. We believe that the critical-level
utilitarian principles with positive critical levels and their generalized counterparts are
the most satisfactory; see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a] and Blackorby and
Donaldson [1984]. Critical-level utilitarianism is a one-parameter family of principles. The
parameter is a ﬁxed critical level of utility that applies to all alternatives, and the crite-
rion used to rank the alternatives is the sum of the diﬀerences between individual utilities
and the critical level. Critical-level generalized utilitarianism uses transformed utilities,
thereby allowing for inequality aversion in individual well-being: if the transformation is
(strictly) concave, the resulting principle is (strictly) inequality-averse.
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Due to space limitations, we cannot go beyond a brief introduction to the subject and
refer the reader to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a] for an extensive treatment.
We focus on critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles because we consider those with
positive critical levels to be the most suitable for social evaluation. In addition to char-
acterizing these and other critical-level principles, we discuss an impossibility result as an
example for the dilemmas and conﬂicts that arise in population ethics.
Section 2 introduces a welfarist and anonymous approach to population ethics, along
with the population principles that are of interest in this survey. Section 3 illustrates the
dilemmas that arise in populations ethics by means of an impossibility result. In Section
4, we provide a characterization of critical-level generalized utilitarianism and three of
its sub-classes. Some issues that are not addressed in the previous sections are discussed
brieﬂy in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Variable-population anonymous welfarism
We use R to denote the set of all real numbers, and Z++ is the set of positive integers.
1n is the vector consisting of n ∈ Z++ ones. Suppose there is a set of alternatives X.
Each element x ∈ X is a full description of all relevant aspects of the world, including the
identities of everyone alive in x and everything that may aﬀect a person’s lifetime well-
being. We assume that, for each possible (ﬁnite but arbitrarily large) population, there
are at least three alternatives with that population. Potential individuals are indexed by
positive integers and, for an individual i ∈ Z++, Xi is the subset of X consisting of all
alternatives x such that i is alive in x. An individual utility function for i is a mapping
Ui:Xi → R, interpreted as an indicator of lifetime well-being. Thus, for x ∈ Xi, Ui(x) is
i’s lifetime utility in alternatives x. Note that the domain of Ui is Xi and, therefore, i’s
well-being is only deﬁned for alternatives in which the person exists. A proﬁle of utility
functions is an inﬁnite-dimensional vector U = (U1, U2, . . . , Ui, . . .) containing one utility
function for each potential person.
A social-evaluation functional assigns a social ordering of the alternatives to each
possible proﬁle. An ordering is a reﬂexive, complete and transitive binary relation, and
the social ordering is interpreted as a goodness relation. Because we employ a welfarist
approach, a single social-evaluation ordering R deﬁned on the set Ω = ∪n∈Z++Rn of all
utility vectors is suﬃcient to perform all comparisons for any proﬁle under consideration.
The asymmetric factor of R is denoted by P and I is the symmetric factor of R. The rela-
tion R is interpreted as an at-least-as-good-as-relation and P and I are the corresponding
better-than and as-good-as relations. According to welfarism, an alternative x ∈ X is at
least as good as an alternative y ∈ X given the proﬁle U if and only if the utility vector
U(x) is at least as good as the utility vector U(y) according to R. Thus, knowledge of
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those alive in two alternatives and their lifetime utilities is suﬃcient to rank any two alter-
natives for any proﬁle. We refer the reader to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a,
ch. 3] for the details of obtaining R in a variable-population setting. Fixed-population ver-
sions of the welfarism theorem are discussed in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005b],
Blau [1976], Bossert and Weymark [2004], d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977], Guha [1972],
Hammond [1979] and Sen [1977], for instance. In addition, we assume social evaluation to
be anonymous in the sense that the identities of the individuals are irrelevant in ranking
alternatives—only the lifetime utilities achieved in two alternatives can inﬂuence the social
ranking of the two. Thus, R is assumed to be such that uIv for all n ∈ Z++ and for all
u, v ∈ Rn such that u is a permutation of v. Because of this anonymity property, we can
without loss of generality assume that if there are n ∈ Z++ individuals alive, they are the
individuals labelled from 1 to n.
We conclude this section by introducing the population principles that are of partic-
ular interest in this paper. For the deﬁnition of these principles, it is important to keep in
mind that neutrality is normalized to a lifetime-utility level of zero. For other normaliza-
tions, the formulation of the principles has to be amended accordingly; see, for instance,
Dasgupta [1993] who, somewhat unconventionally, uses a negative utility level to represent
neutrality.
The ﬁrst principle we deﬁne is classical utilitarianism, which ranks utility vectors
(and, thus, alternatives) on the basis of the total utilities obtained in them. According to
classical utilitarianism,
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
m∑
i=1
vi
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm.
Average utilitarianism employs average utilities instead of total utilities for social
evaluation. Thus, the average-utilitarian principle is deﬁned by
uRv ⇔ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ui ≥ 1
m
m∑
i=1
vi
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm.
Critical-level utilitarianism with a parameter value of α ∈ R generalizes classical
utilitarianism by replacing utilities with the diﬀerences between utilities and the critical-
level parameter. This leads to the principle deﬁned by
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
[ui − α] ≥
m∑
i=1
[vi − α]
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm. Clearly, classical utilitarianism is
obtained for α = 0.
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All of the above principles produce identical ﬁxed-population comparisons, namely,
those corresponding to utilitarianism.
Generalizations are obtained by replacing utility levels (including critical levels) with
transformed utilities. Letting g:R→ R be a continuous and increasing function such that
g(0) = 0, the classical generalized-utilitarian principle corresponding to g is deﬁned by
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
m∑
i=1
g(vi)
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm, average generalized utilitarianism
is given by
uRv ⇔ 1
n
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥ 1
m
m∑
i=1
g(vi)
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm, and the critical-level generalized-
utilitarian principle for g is
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
[g(ui)− g(α)] ≥
m∑
i=1
[g(vi)− g(α)]
for all n,m ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all v ∈ Rm.
Again, ﬁxed-population comparisons are the same for all of the generalized principles—
they reduce to those according to generalized utilitarianism. If g is (strictly) concave, the
resulting principle is (strictly) inequality-averse with respect to lifetime well-being.
3. An impossibility result
There are numerous impossibility results in the population-ethics literature that estab-
lish the incompatibility of seemingly plausible axioms. The purpose of this section is to
illustrate this observation by means of an impossibility theorem (Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2006a]). The axioms that follow are employed.
A weakening of the well-known weak-Pareto principle is obtained if social better-
ness is required whenever one equal utility distribution strictly dominates another equal
distribution. We call this axiom minimal increasingness; it is satisﬁed by all population
principles introduced in Section 2.
Minimal increasingness: For all n ∈ Z++ and for all a, b ∈ R, if a > b, then a1nPb1n.
Weak inequality aversion requires that, for any given population and any given total
utility, the equal distribution is at least as good as any unequal distribution with the
same total utility. The axiom is satisﬁed by all of the generalized principles (critical-level
utilitarian as well as average) associated with a concave transformation g.
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Weak inequality aversion: For all n ∈ Z++ and for all u ∈ Rn,
(
(1/n)
∑n
i=1 ui
)
1nRu.
Sikora [1978] suggests extending the standard Pareto principle to non-existing indi-
viduals, an axiom he refers to as the Pareto-plus principle. It is usually deﬁned as the
conjunction of strong Pareto (deﬁned formally in the following section) and the require-
ment that the addition of an individual above neutrality to a utility-unaﬀected population
is a social improvement. Because the full force of strong Pareto is not required (our im-
possibility theorem stated below merely assumes minimal increasingness), we retain strong
Pareto as a separate axiom and deﬁne Pareto plus as follows.
Pareto plus: For all n ∈ Z++, for all u ∈ Rn and for all a > 0, (u, a)Pu.
In the axiom statement, the common population in u and (u, a) is unaﬀected. To defend
the axiom, therefore, it must be argued that a life above neutrality is better than non-
existence. While it is possible to compare alternatives with diﬀerent populations from
a social point of view (which is, after all, the fundamental issue addressed in population
ethics), such comparisons are implausible if made from the viewpoint of an individual if the
person is not alive in all alternatives to be compared. It is therefore diﬃcult to interpret
this axiom as a Pareto condition because it appears to be based on the idea that people who
do not exist have interests that should be respected. For that reason, we do not consider
Pareto plus to be very compelling. Pareto plus is satisﬁed by all critical-level generalized-
utilitarian principles with non-positive critical levels. Average generalized utilitarianism
and critical-level generalized utilitarianism with positive critical levels do not possess this
property.
We follow Parﬁt [1984] in considering the repugnant conclusion an unacceptable prop-
erty of a population principle. Thus, our ﬁnal axiom requires that this conclusion be
avoided. A population principle implies the repugnant conclusion if and only if, for any
population size n ∈ Z++, any positive utility level ξ and any utility level ε ∈ (0, ξ), there
exists a population size m > n such that an m-person alternative in which every individual
experiences utility level ε is ranked as better than an n-person society in which every indi-
vidual’s utility level is ξ. The axiom that requires the repugnant conclusion to be avoided
is deﬁned as follows.
Avoidance of the repugnant conclusion: There exist n ∈ Z++, ξ ∈ R++ and ε ∈ (0, ξ)
such that, for all m > n, ξ1nRε1m.
As is straightforward to verify, critical-level generalized utilitarianism satisﬁes Pareto plus
if and only if the critical level α is non-positive and satisﬁes avoidance of the repug-
nant conclusion if and only if α is positive. Thus, no critical-level generalized-utilitarian
principle can satisfy Pareto plus and, at the same time, avoid the repugnant conclusion.
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However, this incompatibility extends well beyond these principles. As an illustration, we
reproduce an impossibility theorem due to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2006a]. In
particular, we show that all minimally increasing and weakly inequality-averse population
principles that satisfy Pareto plus lead to the repugnant conclusion. Similar theorems
can be found in Arrhenius [2000], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a], Blackorby,
Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson [1991], Carlson [1998]
and Ng [1989], for instance.
Theorem 1: There exists no anonymous social-evaluation ordering R that satisﬁes min-
imal increasingness, weak inequality aversion, Pareto plus and avoidance of the repugnant
conclusion.
Proof. Suppose R satisﬁes minimal increasingness, weak inequality aversion and Pareto
plus. We complete the proof by showing that R must imply the repugnant conclusion.
For any population size n ∈ Z++, let ξ, ε and δ be utility levels such that 0 < δ < ε < ξ.
Choose the positive integer r such that
r > n
(ξ − ε)
(ε− δ) . (1)
Because the numerator and the denominator of the right side of this inequality are both
positive, r is positive. By Pareto plus, (ξ1n, δ1r)Pξ1n. Average utility in (ξ1n, δ1r) is
(nξ + rδ)/(n + r) so, by minimal inequality aversion, [(nξ + rδ)/(n + r)]1n+rR(ξ1n, δ1r).
By (1),
ε >
nξ + rδ
n + r
and, by minimal increasingness, ε1n+rP [(nξ + rδ)/(n + r)]1n+r. Using transitivity, it
follows that ε1n+rPξ1n and, letting m = n+r > n, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion
is violated.
If weak inequality aversion is dropped from the list of axioms in the theorem, the
remaining axioms are compatible. For example, geometrism, a principle proposed by
Sider [1991], satisﬁes all axioms other than weak inequality aversion. The principle uses a
constant k ∈ (0, 1) between zero and one and ranks alternatives with a weighted sum of
utilities, where the weights are such that the jth-highest non-negative utility level receives
a weight of kj−1 and the th-lowest negative utility receives a weight of k−1. Critical
levels are all zero and the repugnant conclusion is avoided but, because weights on higher
positive utilities exceed weights on lower ones, the principle prefers inequality of positive
utilities over equality (see Arrhenius and Bykvist [1995]).
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4. A characterization of critical-level generalized utilitarianism
Critical-level generalized utilitarianism can be characterized by means of a set of plausible
and intuitively appealing axioms. The ﬁrst of these applies to ﬁxed-population comparisons
only. It is the well-known strong-Pareto requirement which demands that unanimity be
respected.
Strong Pareto: For all n ∈ Z++ and for all u, v ∈ Rn, if ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
with at least one strict inequality, then uPv.
The standard deﬁnition of strong Pareto encompasses Pareto indiﬀerence, requiring that
if everyone in a ﬁxed population has the same level of well-being in two alternatives,
the two should be ranked as equally good. In our welfarist framework, this property is
automatically satisﬁed because the relation R is reﬂexive.
Our second axiom is another ﬁxed-population requirement. Continuity requires that
small changes in utilities should not lead to large changes in the social ranking.
Continuity: For all n ∈ Z++ and for all u ∈ Rn, the sets {v ∈ Rn | vRu} and {v ∈ Rn |
uRv} are closed in Rn.
Existence of a critical level is an axiom regarding the comparison of alternatives
with diﬀerent population sizes, ensuring that at least some non-trivial trade-oﬀs between
population size and well-being are possible. It requires the existence of a critical level for
at least one utility vector. Critical levels need not exist for other utility vectors and if they
do, they need not be constant. Thus, the axiom is very weak.
Existence of a critical level: There exists u¯ ∈ Ω and c ∈ R such that (u¯, c)Iu¯.
Strong Pareto, continuity and existence of a critical level are satisﬁed by all of the
principles introduced in Section 2. In contrast, the ﬁnal axiom used in our characterization
is satisﬁed by all critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles but violated by average
utilitarianism and its generalized counterpart. Existence independence is a separability
axiom that applies not only to ﬁxed-population comparisons but also to those involving
diﬀerent populations. It requires the social ranking to be independent of the existence
of the unconcerned—individuals who are not aﬀected by the ranking of two alternatives.
See d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977], for example, for a ﬁxed-population version of this
independence property.
Existence independence: For all u, v, w ∈ Ω, (u, w)R(v, w)⇔ uRv.
These axioms characterize critical-level generalized utilitarianism, as established in
the following theorem.
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Theorem 2: An anonymous social-evaluation ordering R satisﬁes strong Pareto, conti-
nuity, existence of a critical level and existence independence if and only if R is critical-level
generalized-utilitarian.
Proof. That critical-level generalized utilitarianism satisﬁes the required axioms is straight-
forward to verify. To prove the reverse implication, consider ﬁrst the case of a ﬁxed popu-
lation size n ≥ 3. Applying Debreu’s [1959, pp. 56–59] representation theorem, continuity
implies the existence of a continuous function fn:Rn → R such that, for all u, v ∈ Rn,
uRv ⇔ fn(u) ≥ fn(v).
By strong Pareto, fn is increasing in all arguments, and the anonymity of R implies that
fn is symmetric. Existence independence implies that {1, . . . , n} \M is separable in fn
from its complement M for any choice of M such that ∅ = M ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Gorman’s
[1968] theorem on overlapping separable sets of variables (see also Acze´l [1966, p. 312]
and Blackorby, Primont and Russell [1978, p. 127]) implies that fn is additively separable.
Therefore, there exist continuous and increasing functions Hn:R → R and gni :R → R for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
fn(u) = Hn
( n∑
i=1
gni (ui)
)
for all u ∈ Rn. Because fn is symmetric, each gni can be chosen to be independent of i,
and we deﬁne gn = gni for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, because fn is a representation of
the restriction of R to Rn and Hn is increasing,
uRv ⇔ Hn
( n∑
i=1
gn(ui)
)
≥ Hn
( n∑
i=1
gn(vi)
)
⇔
n∑
i=1
gn(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn(vi)
(2)
for all u, v ∈ Rn. Without loss of generality, gn can be chosen so that gn(0) = 0.
Next, we prove that there exists a utility level α ∈ R which is a critical level for all
utility vectors in Ω. Let u ∈ Ω be arbitrary. By existence of a critical level, there exist
u¯ ∈ Ω and c ∈ R such that (u¯, c)Iu¯. Applying existence independence twice, we obtain
(u, u¯, c)I(u, u¯) and (u, c)Iu. Thus, c is a critical level not only for u¯ but also for any u ∈ Ω.
Letting α = c establishes the claim.
Now we show that, for all n ≥ 3, the functions gn and gn+1 can be chosen to be the
same. Let u, v ∈ Rn. Because α ∈ R is a critical level for all utility vectors in Ω, we have
uRv ⇔ (u, α)R(v, α). (3)
9
By (2),
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
gn(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn(vi) (4)
and
(u, α)R(v, α)⇔
n∑
i=1
gn+1(ui) + g
n+1(α) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn+1(vi) + g
n+1(α)
⇔
n∑
i=1
gn+1(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn+1(vi).
(5)
Therefore, using (3), (4) and (5),
n∑
i=1
gn(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn(vi) ⇔
n∑
i=1
gn+1(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
gn+1(vi),
which means that the same function can be used for gn and for gn+1. Because this is true
for all n ≥ 3, it follows that the functions gn can be chosen independently of n, and we
write g = gn for all n ≥ 3. Together with (2), it follows that, for all n ≥ 3 and for all
u, v ∈ Rn,
uRv ⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
g(vi). (6)
Next, we prove that (6) must be true for n ∈ {1, 2} as well. Let u, v ∈ R1. By strong
Pareto and the increasingness of g,
uRv ⇔ u1 ≥ v1 ⇔ g(u1) ≥ g(v1). (7)
If u, v ∈ R2, existence independence and (6) together imply
uRv ⇔ (u, α)R(v, α)⇔
2∑
i=1
g(ui) + g(α) ≥
2∑
i=1
g(vi) + g(α)
⇔
2∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
2∑
i=1
g(vi).
(8)
(6), (7) and (8) imply that all ﬁxed-population comparisons are carried out according to
generalized utilitarianism with the same transformation for all population sizes.
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To complete the proof, let n,m ∈ Z++ with n = m, u ∈ Rn and v ∈ Rm. Suppose
n > m. By deﬁnition of the critical level α,
uRv ⇔ uR(v, α1n−m)
⇔
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
m∑
i=1
g(vi) + (n−m)g(α)
⇔
n∑
i=1
[g(ui)− g(α)] ≥
m∑
i=1
[g(vi)− g(α)]
.
An analogous argument applies to the case n < m and it follows that R is critical-level
generalized-utilitarian.
As mentioned earlier, adding Pareto plus (respectively avoidance of the repugnant
conclusion) to the axioms of Theorem 2 leads to a characterization of the sub-class of
critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles the members of which have a non-positive
(respectively positive) critical level. These observations are summarized in the following
two theorems.
Theorem 3: An anonymous social-evaluation ordering R satisﬁes strong Pareto, conti-
nuity, existence of a critical level, existence independence and Pareto plus if and only if R
is critical-level generalized-utilitarian with a non-positive critical-level parameter.
Theorem 4: An anonymous social-evaluation ordering R satisﬁes strong Pareto, conti-
nuity, existence of a critical level, existence independence and avoidance of the repugnant
conclusion if and only if R is critical-level generalized-utilitarian with a positive critical-
level parameter.
Because we consider the repugnant conclusion unacceptable and see minimal increas-
ingness and weak inequality aversion as obviously appealing, Theorems 3 and 4 suggest
that Pareto plus should be abandoned. Furthermore, we advocate weakly inequality-averse
principles satisfying the axioms of Theorem 2 and, as a consequence, we recommend the
critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with a positive critical level α and a concave
utility transformation g characterized in our ﬁnal theorem.
Theorem 5: An anonymous social-evaluation ordering R satisﬁes weak inequality aver-
sion, strong Pareto, continuity, existence of a critical level, existence independence and
avoidance of the repugnant conclusion if and only if R is critical-level generalized-utilitarian
with a positive critical-level parameter and a concave utility transformation.
11
5. Some issues and extensions
In this section, we address several additional issues that are not discussed above. Each is
examined in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a]. Some are present in both ﬁxed-
population and variable-population environments; others appear in variable-population
environments only.
5.1. Utility measurement and interpersonal comparisons
If utilities are ordinally measurable and interpersonally non-comparable, Arrow’s [1951,
1963] theorem, appropriately modiﬁed, leads to an impossibility. Utilities can be assumed
to be numerically measurable and interpersonally comparable in order to allow for the
largest class of principles. Although this assumption is strong, if utilities are cardinally
measurable (unique up to increasing aﬃne transformations) and interpersonally compara-
ble at two utility levels, full numerical comparability results from choosing utility numbers
for the two levels.
5.2. The neutrality normalization
We follow the standard practice in the literature and assign a utility level of zero to neu-
trality. The idea of neutrality is not necessary for many theorems, including Theorems
1 and 2. Indeed, Dasgupta [1988, 1993] and Hammond [1988] do without neutrality and
normalize the critical level in critical-level generalized utilitarianism to zero. Such a nor-
malization is not without its diﬃculties, however. If best alternatives are compared when
critical levels diﬀer, individual utilities must change.
5.3. Welfarism and the account of well-being
Sen [1987, p. 11] criticizes welfarism on the grounds that “the battered slave, the broken
unemployed, the hopeless destitute, the tamed housewife, may have the courage to desire
little.” Because we use accounts of well-being that include all aspects of well-being whether
they accord with preferences or not, such as those of Griﬃn [1986] and Sumner [1996], this
diﬃculty does not arise.
5.4. One or many proﬁles
It can be argued that, when comparing complete histories, multiple proﬁles are inappro-
priate. Although the single-proﬁle approach is less well developed than the multi-proﬁle
approach, we have argued that a richness condition on the set of alternatives together
with adapted versions of axioms such as anonymity, are suﬃcient to make the results
of the multi-proﬁle case apply in the single-proﬁle environment (Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2006b]).
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5.5. Dynamics
The model presented in this article can be modiﬁed to accommodate multiple time periods.
If this is done, Pareto indiﬀerence rules out discounting of future lifetime utilities. That
axiom can be modiﬁed to allow discounting of lifetime utilities, however, if the axiom is
conditional on birth dates.
Sometimes, population principles are applied to single periods using per-period utili-
ties. If this is done and critical levels are not zero, diﬃculties arise. Suppose, for example,
that a person lives one period longer in alternative x than in y with a utility level of zero
in the additional period, all else the same. If a per-period utility level of zero represents
neutrality in the period, every person is equally well oﬀ in the two alternatives from the
timeless perspective, Pareto indiﬀerence requires x and y to be ranked as equally good,
and consistency between per-period rankings and the timeless ranking requires the critical
level to be zero for the per-period ranking.
5.6. Uncertainty
The critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles can be used to rank actions or combi-
nations of institutional arrangements (including legal and educational ones), customs, and
moral rules, taking account of the constraints of history and human nature. If each of these
leads with certainty to a particular social alternative, they can be ranked with any wel-
farist principle. But consequences may be uncertain and, in that case, probabilities may be
assigned to outcomes and the resulting uncertain alternatives ranked with extended popu-
lation principles. One class of such principles, which can be justiﬁed axiomatically, consists
of the ex-ante critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles; see Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [2005a, ch. 7, 2006c]. These principles employ value functions that are equiva-
lent to the critical-level generalized-utilitarian value functions applied to expected utilities.
5.7. Incomplete rankings
There are population principles which declare alternatives to be unranked in some circum-
stances. One such class of principles is the critical-band generalized-utilitarian class, which
uses an interval (the band). Two alternatives are ranked if and only if one is declared bet-
ter than the other by all critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with critical levels
in the band.
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5.8. Choice functions
Because many policy decisions have population consequences, it is natural to use popula-
tion principles to guide them. These decision problems are, in most cases, choice problems:
one or more options must be selected from a set of feasible alternatives. The maximizing
approach to solving choice problems requires the selection of a best feasible alternative,
according to a social ranking. Although this is a reasonable way to proceed, it excludes
consideration of choice procedures that are not based on social orderings from the outset.
A natural way to proceed, therefore, is to focus on choice functions and ask whether
the choices can be rationalized by a social ordering. Axioms must therefore be employed
that apply to choices rather than rankings of alternatives. This is a complex problem, but
it is possible to ﬁnd a set of such axioms that characterizes a choice-theoretic version of
critical-level generalized utilitarianism (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a, ch. 10].
6. Concluding remarks
This survey provides but a brief introduction to the many issues that arise in population
ethics. There are numerous other principles that have been suggested and analyzed in
the literature. For example, number-dampened principles, their restricted counterparts,
and restricted versions of critical-level principles (see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson
[2005a, ch. 5], Hurka [1983, 2000] and Ng [1986]) fail to satisfy existence independence,
whereas variable-population versions of leximin become possible if continuity is dropped
as a requirement. And, if social relations are not required to be complete, principles such
as critical-band utilitarianism, based on an interval of critical levels, can be characterized.
As mentioned above, population issues can be analyzed in an intertemporal frame-
work and in choice-theoretic settings. Although we restrict attention to a model with
certain outcomes in this brief survey, it is possible to include uncertainty in population
ethics. These extensions as well as related issues and applications are discussed in detail
in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005a].
There are, however, open questions in population ethics. Some principles for ﬁxed-
population social evaluation, such as that corresponding to the the Gini social-evaluation
function (see Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]) are not additively separable. It is not
known whether they can be extended to population problems in a reasonable way.
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